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1 Introduction
This is a very nice paper. The main points are important, the structure is
simple and clear, and I find the key arguments persuasive. In my comments
I’m going to begin by summarizing the heart of the Orphanides-Williams
argument. Then I will locate their paper within the rapidly growing literature
on learning and monetary policy. Finally I will return to their paper and
oﬀer a number of specific comments on natural extensions or alternative
approaches.
2 Summary of the Argument
Orphanides and Williams (OW) work with a simple two equation macro
model. The first equation is an augmented Phillips curve with inertia:
πt+1 = φπet+1 + (1− φ)πt + αyt+1 + et+1,
where πt+1 is the rate of inflation between period t and period t + 1, πet+1
is the rate of inflation over this period expected at time t, yt+1 is the level
of the output gap in t + 1 and et+1 is a white noise inflation shock. The
second equation is an aggregate demand relation that embodies a lagged
policy eﬀect,
yt+1 = xt + ut+1.
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xt is set by monetary policy at t and ut+1 is white noise. Through monetary
policy it is assumed that policy makers are able one period ahead to control
aggregate output up to the unpredictable random disturbance ut+1.
The combination of this aggregate demand equation and the neoclassi-
cal (as opposed to neo-Keynesian) inflation equation yields a particularly
tractable model for studying the eﬀects of private agents learning. In partic-
ular, the timing assumptions are carefully crafted to yield simplicity.
Policy makers choose the xt process to minimize
(1− ω)Ey2t + ωE(πt − π∗)2.
This is a standard quadratic loss function. We can think of ω as reflecting
policy makers preferences, which may (or may not) be derived from the
preferences of the representative agent.
2.1 Optimal Policy under RE
Under rational expectations (RE) optimal policy takes the form of the feed-
back rule
xt = −θP (πt − π∗),
where θP = θP (ω, α/(1− φ)). This leads to an eﬃciency frontier, described
by a familiar trade-oﬀ between σπ and σy, shown in their Figure 1.
For this choice of feedback parameter, in the rational expectations equi-
librium (REE) inflation follows the process
πt = cP0 + cP1 πt−1 + noiset
Etπt+1 = cP0 + cP1 πt,
where cP0 , cP1 depend on θPα/(1− φ). Here noiset is white noise. The super-
script “P” refers to “perfect knowledge,” which OW use as a synonym for
RE.
Thus under RE the problem is quite straightforward. How “aggressive”
policy should be with respect to deviations of inflation from target depends
in a natural way on the structural parameters φ, α and the policy maker
preferences as described by ω.
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2.2 Least Squares Learning
Now we make the crucial step of backing away from RE. Instead of assuming
that agents are endowed a priori with RE we model the agents as forecasting
in the same way that an econometrician might: by assuming a simple time
series model for the variable of interest, and by estimating its parameters
and using it to forecast. Specifically suppose that private agents believe that
inflation follows an AR(1) process, as it does in an REE, but that they do
not know cP0 , cP1 . Instead they estimate the parameters of
πt = c0 + c1πt−1 + vt
by a least-squares-type regression, and at time t forecast
πet+1 = c0,t + c1,tπt.
Over time the estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated as new data become available.
We consider two cases for this updating.
2.2.1 Infinite memory — “decreasing gain”
First we suppose that agents literally do Least Squares using all the data.
We assume that policy-makers do not explicitly take account of private agent
learning and follow the feedback rule with θ = θP . Then, with “infinite
memory” (no discounting of observations), one can show (e.g. (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001))
c0,t, c1,t → cP0 , cP1 w.p.1,
so that asymptotically we get the optimal REE.
Technically the most convenient way to set up least squares learning by
private agents is using the RLS (recursive least squares) algorithm.1 In this
algorithm the agents carry their parameter estimates (and an estimate of
the second moment matrix of the regressors) into the next period. Updated
estimates next period are then generated recursively using the most recent
data point. Because each data point is counted equally by least squares the
“gain” κt, i.e. the eﬀective weight placed on the last data point, is given by
1The technique of formulating learning as a recursive algorithm, and then applying
stochastic approximation tools to analyze convergence, was introduced by (Marcet and
Sargent 1989).
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κt = 1/t , i.e. by the inverse of the sample size. In the learning literature
this is called the “decreasing gain” case, because κt → 0 as t→∞.
I remark that convergence to the REE is not obvious. This is because
the model is “self-referential.” i.e. the evolution of the data depends on
expectations and hence on the estimated coeﬃcients and these in turn are
updated using the data generated. Convergence to REE does take place
because the equilibrium in this model satisfies the “E-stability” conditions
that govern stability in such a system.
2.2.2 Finite memory — “constant gain”
OW make a small but significant change to the standard least-squares up-
dating formula. Instead of assuming that all observations count equally, they
discount or downweight past data. In terms of the RLS algorithm, this is
accomplished technically by setting the gain, the weight on the most recent
observation used to update estimates, to a small constant i.e. setting κt = κ
(e.g. 0.05).
Why would it be natural for agents to use a constant rather than de-
creasing gain? The main rationale for this procedure is that it allows es-
timates to remain alert to structural shifts. As economists, and as econo-
metricians, we tend to believe that structural changes occasionally occur,
and we might therefore assume that private agents also recognize and allow
for this. Although in principle one might attempt to model the process of
structural change, this typically unduly strains the amount of knowledge we
have about the economic structure. A reasonable alternative is to adjust pa-
rameter estimators to reflect the fact that recent observations convey more
accurate information on the economy’s law of motion than do past data, and
“constant gain” estimators are one very natural way of accomplishing this
downweighting of past data.2
2.2.3 Implications of constant gain Least Squares
With constant gain procedures, estimates no longer fully converge to the
REE. The estimators c0,t, c1,t converge instead to a stochastic process. Be-
2Two remarks are in order. First, an alternative rationale for constant gain is that
it can be an equilibrium in learning rules, even if structural change is not present — see
Section 14.4 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). Second, there are other ways of allowing for
strucrural change, e.g. through time varying gain sequences or explicit models of structural
variation.
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cause of this OW use the term “perpetual learning” to refer to the constant
gain case.
If the gain parameter κ is very small, then estimators will be close to
the REE values for most of the time with high probability, and output and
inflation will be near their REE paths. Nonetheless, small plausible values
like κ = 0.05 can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes in the calibrations OW
consider. In particular they find:
1. The standard deviations of c0,t and c1,t are large even though forecast
performance remains good.
2. There is a substantial increase in the persistence of inflation, compared
to the REE.
3. Most strikingly, the policy frontier shifts out very substantially and in
a non-monotonic way (See their Figure 5).
2.2.4 Policy Implications
Under perpetual learning if policy makers keep to the same class of rules
xt = −θS(πt − π∗),
then they should choose a diﬀerent θ. Here the notation θS is meant to
indicate that we restrict policy makers to choose from the same “simple”
class of policy rules. There are four main implications for policy in the
context of constant gain (perpetual) learning by private agents.
1. Naive policy choice can be strictly ineﬃcient. This is illustrated in
the second diagram of their Figure 5. By “naive” policy is meant the
policy that assumes RE (perfect knowledge) on the part of agents,
when in fact the agents are following perpetual learning with κ > 0.
In particular there are cases in which increasing θS would decrease the
standard deviations of both inflation and output.
2. In general, policy should be more hawkish, i.e. under perpetual learning
the monetary authorities should pick a larger θS than if agents had RE.
3. Following a sequence of unanticipated inflation shocks, inflation doves
(i.e. policy-makers with low θ reflecting a low ω) can do very poorly.
This is illustrated in their Figure 3.
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4. If the inflation target π∗ is known to private agents, so that they need
estimate only the slope parameter c1, then the policy frontier is more
favorable than when it is not known. This is illustrated in the first
diagram of their Figure 9.
I’ll return to a discussion of these and other specific results after discussing
learning and monetary policy in a more general setting.
3 Learning in Monetary Policy
Recently considerable research has begun to focus on the implications for
monetary policy when explicit account is taken of the literature on adap-
tive/econometric learning in macroeconomics.3
I will give a selective overview of this recent research and locate OW
within this context. Then I will return to a discussion of OW. There are
four main issues I’ll use to group my general remarks: (i) the theoretical
roles played by learning, (ii) the question of who or what group of agents is
learning, (iii) the particular implications of constant gain learning, and (iv)
some further (personal) thoughts on rationality.
3.1 Roles for Learning
There are three main types of result that can be delivered by incorporating
learning into a monetary policy model.
3.1.1 Stability under private agent learning
Under learning an REE need not necessarily be stable under private agent
learning. It is logically possible that if agents follow LS learning (with the
usual decreasing gain) that the system fails to converge to an REE, even if
their parameter estimates are initially close to the REE.
This theoretical possibility of instability turns out to be a genuine concern
for monetary policy in New Keynesian/New PC models (as is the related
but distinct issue of indeterminacy). (Bullard and Mitra 2002) show that
3For example, two recent workshops or conferences have considered this topic, one at
the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, in February 2001, on “Learning and Model Misspeci-
fication,” and a second at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, in March 2003, on “Monetary
Policy and Learning.”
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stability under private agent learning should not be taken for granted if policy
makers follow Taylor-type rules. Depending on the specific formulation of the
rule, instability can arise for certain choices of parameter settings. (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003a), (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b), and (Evans and
Honkapohja 2002a) examine this issue in the context of optimal monetary
policy. They show that stability under learning is a pervasive problem when
the interest rate rule is formulated as a reaction to fundamental shocks, but
can be overcome when the rule reacts appropriately to private expectations.
Recent work by (Preston 2003) has considered this issue in the context of
long-horizon agents.
3.1.2 Selection criterion
In some models the phenomenon of indeterminacy, i.e. multiple REE, arises.
In this setting, learning can provide a natural way of choosing between equi-
libria. A particular question of interest is the following. It is known that
when a steady state of a linear model is indeterminate there exist “sunspot”
equilibria, i.e. REE in which the solution is driven by extraneous noise.
Such solutions, with economic fluctuations driven in a self-fulfilling way by
extrinsic random variables, would usually be considered an unintended and
undesirable by-product of economic policy. A particular question of interest,
in cases of multiple equilibria, is whether the sunspot equilibria can be stable
under learning.
It has been known for some time that it is possible in some cases for
sunspot equilibria to be stable under learning. This was initially demon-
strated by (Woodford 1990) in the context of the overlapping generations
model of money. In general, whether a sunspot equilibrium is stable under
learning depends on the model and the particular solution, see Chapter 12
of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). There has been recent interest in whether
stable sunspot solutions can arise in more realistic monetary models. In par-
ticular, (Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001) look at when this can occur
cash-in-advance models, and (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001), (Carlstrom and
Fuerst 2000) and (Evans and McGough 2003) examine the issue for New
Keynesian models.
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3.1.3 Non-REE learning dynamics
Finally, we move to the possibility that the economy under learning gener-
ates solutions that in some way go beyond rational expectations. Here it
appears useful to group results into two broad categories. One possibility is
that learning converges to a “Restricted Perceptions Equilibria.” This arises
if agents are endowed with an econometric model that is misspecified asymp-
totically, as discussed in Chapter 13 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001)). For
example, agents may omit some variables that help forecast the variables of
interest or their forecasting model may fail to capture nonlinearities that are
present.
Somewhat more radically, learning may generate “persistent learning dy-
namics” (see Chapter 14 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001)) as a result of
local instability of an REE under learning (as in (Bullard 1994)) or due to
a learning rule that fails to fully converge to REE parameter values (as in
constant gain learning rules). The OW paper falls into this last class: private
agents use a learning rule in which parameter estimates never quite converge
to REE values. This “perpetual learning” then turns out to have major pol-
icy implications, even when the deviation from REE might be thought not
too large.
3.2 Who is learning?
The earliest literature on learning focussed on private agents, i.e. house-
holds and firms. In dynamic macroeconomic models private agents, in order
to make optimal decisions, must make forecasts of relevant future variables.
Clearly the expectations of households and firms do matter enormously for
the actual evolution of the economy. The rational expectations revolution
made the crucial advance of defining and analyzing what it means for expec-
tations to be consistent with the economic structure and optimizing agents.
However, this has had the potential disadvantage of demoting private expec-
tations as an independent force. Consequently it was natural that the initial
focus of the learning literature was on private agent learning. The OW paper
follows the primary strand of the literature in this respect.
However, policy makers also need to form expectations and make forecasts
and they too are not endowed with full knowledge of the economic structure
or fully rational forecast functions. Some recent research has begun to tackle
this issue. Most notably Thomas Sargent’s book on the disinflation in the
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1990s, (Sargent 1999), emphasized learning by policy makers about a (mis-
specifed) Phillips curve trade-oﬀ. Sargent’s model incorporates a tantalizing
combination of misspecification, learning and optimal policy formulation.
Obviously it is possible to allow for separate learning by private agents
and policy-makers. In fact (Sargent 1999) actually allows for this in some
cases, though much of his analysis, and that of (Cho, Williams, and Sargent
2002), focus on learning by policy makers with rational expectations assumed
for private agents. Simultaneous learning by policy makers is also analyzed
in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2002) and discussed in (Evans and Honkapohja
2002a).
There is an additional asymmetry that should be noted. Both private
agents and policy makers need to make forecasts of future aggregate variables,
but in addition, implementation of optimal policy may require simultaneous
estimation of structural parameters. This issue is considered in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a).
3.3 Constant gain learning
As already emphasized, the use of constant gain (or “perpetual”) learning
plays a central role in OW. In general constant gain learning can lead to a
number of phenomena. First, the work of (Sargent 1999), (Cho, Williams,
and Sargent 2002), (Williams 2002) and (Bullard and Cho 2002) emphasize
the possibility of “escapes,” i.e. occasional big deviations from a unique REE.
This is a surprising finding: for significant periods of time learning dynamics
can drive the economy away from the REE, but in a predictable direction.
When there are multiple REE escapes can take a diﬀerent form. The most
widely examined case is the case of multiple distinct REE steady states. Here
escapes take the form of periodic shifts between the diﬀerent steady states
as a result of large random shocks interacting with the learning dynamics.
This phenomenon is seen in Chapter 14 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001)),
the hyperinflation model of (Marcet and Nicolini 1998), the exchange rate
model of (Kasa 2002) and the liquidity trap model of (Evans and Honkapohja
2003b).
Finally, it turns out that, even in a quite standard model with a unique
REE, and without the more exotic eﬀects just described, constant gain learn-
ing has significant implications for optimal policy. This is the important new
finding that is demonstrated in the current paper by OW.
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3.4 Some further thoughts on rationality
In constructing economic models we have three kinds of agents: (i) private
agents, (ii) policy makers and (iii) economists (us). In the bad old days of
adaptive expectations, private agents made systematic mistakes, but we the
economists were very smart. We told policy makers what to do, so they were
smart too.
The rational expectations revolution changed all this. Now private agents
became smart, and policy makers (and earlier economists) were mistaken, as
shown by the Lucas critique. As theorists we were again smart (because we
understood how private agents really formed expectations), but as econome-
tricians we were not quite so smart. This is because as econometricians we
had to estimate parameters that were known with certainty by the private
agents and theorists.
The adaptive learning viewpoint has the enormous advantage over these
earlier approaches that it (potentially) achieves greater cognitive consistency
between these three kinds of agents. In particular, private agents are modeled
as behaving like econometricians, i.e. like economists in our forecasting role.
Of course as theorists we still typically analyze models with a specified struc-
ture that is eﬀectively known only to us, but at least it can be consistently
treated as unknown to private agents, policy makers and econometricians.
Furthermore, the degree of smartness of each group is a matter of choice or
judgement for us as theorists.
An important aspect of this “bounded rationality” approach is that many
features of rational expectations do carry over to the adaptive learning ap-
proach. For example, the Lucas critique can apply under bounded rationality,
as emphasized in (Evans and Ramey 2001). The Lucas critique will often
arise if agents attempt to forecast in an optimal way, even if they are not
perfectly rational in the sense of “rational expectations.”
4 Back to Orphanides & Williams
Returning now to the OW paper, let me make some specific critical comments
and suggest some extensions.
1. The inflation shocks experiment. My first point concerns the inflation
shocks scenario shown in their Fig. 3. OW examine a sequence of unantic-
ipated positive inflation shocks starting with e1 = 2% and declining to zero
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over 9 (semi-annual) periods. My main point is that this is more like a struc-
tural shift, and that the eﬀects are the same as a decrease in potential output
over 4 years. This raises several questions that would need to be explicitly
addressed in a full treatment of this issue.
Suppose, for example, that et+1 partly predictable, as seems appropriate
for a structural shift, and that the loss function is
L = E0{
∞X
t=0
£
(1− ω)(yt − y∗t )2 + ω(πt − π∗)2
¤}.
Depending on the source of the shock, policy makers may want to lower
their output target y∗t (to y∗t = −α−1et). Even if policy-makers continue to
set y∗t = 0, policy should take into account expected et+1 > 0.
This is perhaps a set-up in which it would be particularly fruitful also to
incorporate policy maker learning.
2. Bias towards “hawkishness.” OW show that policy makers should
be more hawkish. The intuition for this result is fairly intuitive. A more
hawkish (high θ) policy helps to keep inflation expectations πet+1 “in line,”
i.e. closer to rational expectations values. This gives policy an additional
role, besides stabilizing y and π, and this additional role means that under
perpetual learning it is optimal for policy makers to be more hawkish than
they would be, for given policy maker preferences, under RE.
This observation leads naturally to the question of how robust this result
is. In particular, in New Keynesian models yet+1 also matters. The structure
is such models is
yt = −ϕ(it − πet+1) + yet+1 + gt
πt = λyt + βπet+1 + γπt−1 + ut.
Will the presence of yet+1 in the “IS” curve make the direction of bias for the
policy-maker ambiguous? The answer is not clear a priori and would need
to be explicitly analyzed.
3. Choice of gain parameter κ. The value of κ is taken as given and not
explained. This is quite standard in the constant gain learning literature. In
one respect this is convenient, since it can then be treated as a parameter to
be estimated empirically.
However, one can think about the issue further from a theoretical view-
point. The most typical rationale for introducing constant gain, as indicated
above, is that it is a way of allowing for structural shifts. The choice of κ
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can then be thought of a providing a balance between tracking and filtering:
high values of κ allow the estimator to better track structural change, but
with the disadvantage of yielding noisier estimators.
One possibility would then be to explicitly introduce structural shifts into
the model and find the optimal value of κ. This type of exercise is done in
Chapter 14 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) and in (Evans and Ramey 2001).
In OW this would add complexity and is unlikely to matter. However, the
issue of the optimal choice of gain is likely to become important in future
work.
4. Smarter agents. Using the bounded rationality approach one can al-
ways ask: should the agents be smarter? less smart? This is always a matter
of judgement. There are several possible ways in which the private agents in
OW could be “smarter.” For example, private agents could be modeled as
estimating an AR(p), instead of an AR(1). Indeed, one could consider the
possibility that the agents choose the lag length p in the same way as an
applied econometrician. Similarly, agents might consider forecasting based
on a vector-autoregression, perhaps using one of the standard statistics to
choose the order of the VAR.
It seems likely that the qualitative results would be unaﬀected, but it
would be of interest to know how the detailed results depend on such spec-
ification issues. It might appear unsatisfactory, compared to the lack of
ambiguity in the RE approach, to be faced with questions about lag length
and model specification. But this is really a strength of the adaptive learn-
ing framework. Econometricians dealing with forecasting and estimation
problems inevitably in practice face precisely such issues. It seems absurd
to assume that private agents and policy-makers have clear-cut answers to
problems that in eﬀect remain research issues for us as econometricians.
5 Conclusions
This is an important paper. Theoretically, Orphanides and Williams provide
a new reason for studying adaptive learning, based on optimal policy when
agents follow “perpetual learning” rules. From an applied viewpoint, the
paper suggests another factor that can generate stagflation, and it provides
policy recommendations that are intuitive and plausible. I hope (and con-
fidently anticipate) that the authors (and others) will do more work along
these lines.
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